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INTRODUCTION
The election of Jair Bolsonaro to the Brazilian presidency, in October 
2018, came as a shock to most observers. He was widely seen by critics, 
experts and left-wingers as being unelectable because of his inexperience, 
lack of organised support by established political parties, big business or 
social organisations, and overt backing for Brazil’s military dictatorship 
(1964-85), torture, guns, and for discrimination against black and indigenous 
peoples, women, LGBTQA+ communities, and so on. Bolsonaro was also 
infamous for having made, regularly, outrageous statements against his 
perceived foes, especially female members of Congress. 
Although his name polled relatively low until the middle of the year, 
Bolsonaro’s poll ratings started climbing rapidly in the weeks immediately 
before the elections. They were boosted by a well-organised social media 
campaign and by a (much-disputed) attempt on his life on 6 September. 
Paradoxically, support for his candidacy grew in response to the Ele Não 
(Not Him) women-led movement, which culminated in large demonstrations 
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around the country on 29 September. Despite – or, perhaps, because of – 
the radicalising resistance against him, Bolsonaro won comfortably the first 
round of the elections, on 7 October, and proceeded to win convincingly, 
by 55-45%, in the second round, on 28 October. The final round pitted 
Bolsonaro against the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) 
candidate, Fernando Haddad, himself standing in for PT leader and former 
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-06, 2007-10), currently in jail on 
highly questionable corruption charges1.
This article reviews Bolsonaro’s election and key traits of his 
administration, which was inaugurated on 1 January 2019. The study 
draws upon three mutually reinforcing strands. First, the worldwide rise of 
the political right, leading to the diffusion of an authoritarian modality of 
neoliberalism in several countries, including Brazil. Second, the internal 
dynamics of the Brazilian left, which can be examined through its historical 
cycles of rise and decline. The most recent of these cycles is driven by the 
fortunes of the PT. Third, the consolidation of a broad right-wing alliance 
in Brazil that has become politically dominant across a whole spectrum 
of areas. Unsurprisingly, this article concludes that the election of Jair 
Bolsonaro is symptomatic of broad social processes, with a wide social 
and geographical remit that are unlikely to be reversed easily, or merely 
through a sudden reversal of fortunes of Bolsonaro’s tragicomically flawed 
administration. These strands are examined in the three substantive sections 
in this article, followed by a summary of the argument in the Conclusion.
1 GLOBAL SHIFTS
At a global level, the tide of authoritarian neoliberalism sweeping 
the world is symptomatic of three processes2. First, the crisis, stagnation 
and stumbling recovery of most neoliberal economies since the Great 
Financial Crisis (GFC) starting in 2007, which subsequently morphed into a 
‘Great Stagnation’ with no clear end in sight3. Second, the crisis of political 
systems and institutions of representation following the GFC and the closely 
related policies of economic ‘austerity’ in many countries that have been 
contributing to the decomposition of neoliberal democracy4. Third, the 
1 For an overview of the case against Lula, see Tardelli (2017). 
2 For a detailed analysis, see Boffo, Saad-Filho and Fine (2019).
3 See, for example, Gordon (2015) and Summers (2015, 2016).
4 See Boffo, Saad-Filho and Fine (2019).
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hijacking of mass discontent by the far right, fronted by a new breed of 
‘spectacular’ politicians, committed both to the intensified reproduction of 
neoliberalism and to their own self-referential power.
These processes can be summarised, necessarily briefly for reasons of 
space, as follows. The global transition to neoliberalism has been associated 
with extensive restructuring of processes of capital accumulation, including 
new products and technologies, new forms of production, employment and 
exchange, new patterns of trade, and, above all, the exponential growth 
of all forms of finance, debt, and fictitious capital5. These shifts have had 
profound implications for social reproduction in general and, specifically, for 
the composition and mode of existence of the working class6. Consequences 
include profound changes in forms and patterns of employment, modes of 
labour, community and class cultures and solidarities, and the decline of 
traditional forms of class representation, including left parties, trade unions 
and mass organisations. 
Their weakening has been closely related to the establishment of 
typically neoliberal institutions, ideologies, rules, policies and practices, 
aiming to buttress as well as promote the neoliberalisation of production and 
social reproduction, and to shield market processes from social accountability. 
Those institutions include, for example, presumably ‘independent’ Central 
Banks (beholden to finance), inflation targeting regimes (primed to protect 
financial asset values), maximum fiscal deficit rules (for the avoidance of 
inflation, and to limit public spending), privatisations (to curtail potential 
levers of public influence over resource allocation and the pattern of 
growth), and the ‘autonomy’ of a range of public bodies (not least a range 
of regulatory agencies invariably captured by the corporations that they 
nominally control)7. The decline of the left, the neoliberal reconstruction 
of the state, and mounting repression, especially since 9-11, have led to a 
marked dislocation of the political spectrum towards the right over the past 
four decades8. 
The technological, economic, institutional, ideological and political 
changes outlined above, and the neoliberal restructuring of social 
5 See Harvey (2007) for a classic account, and Fine and Saad-Filho (2017) for an alternative view.
6 See, for example, Moody (1997, 2017).
7 See Dardot and Laval (2014).
8 For a detailed analysis, see Boffo, Saad-Filho and Fine (2019), Fine and Saad-Filho (2017) and Saad-Filho 
(2017).
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reproduction, have created a vast array of economic ‘losers’, centred – in 
the advanced economies – on the traditional (blue collar) working class. 
These ‘losers’ tend to be politically separated, structurally disorganised, 
ideologically perplexed, practically disenfranchised and, consequently, 
unable or unwilling to express their grievances through the political system 
that neoliberalism itself has imposed. 
Instead of being channelled through the traditional (institutional) 
channels of conflict resolution, mass frustration has, increasingly, tended to 
be captured by, and expressed through, the right-wing media and far-right 
political organisations, movements and governments. They have induced 
the ‘losers’ to blame ‘the other’ for the damages inflicted by neoliberalism 
– with the alleged victims (stereotypically, in the advanced economies, 
hardworking, morally upright and ethnically privileged male-led blue-collar 
families) being defined through cultural and religious hierarchies, as well 
as pre-existing ‘racial’ categories grounded in history. These hierarchies 
are often ancient, and they are grounded in common knowledges and 
widespread prejudices; they require little explanation: a code word here and 
a wink there can be enough. In turn, the ‘other’ is unambiguously defined 
as the poor, immigrants, dark-skinned peoples, poorer countries, minority 
religions, and so on. 
In sum, the politics of resentment foisted upon the working class, 
the underprivileged and the poor under neoliberalism has divided them 
politically, and bolstered new forms of collectivity grounded on nationalist, 
racial and religious discourses defined by exclusion and discrimination. 
More recently, these political platforms have tended to be fronted by self-
appointed ‘leaders’ claiming a unique ability to ‘get things done’ by sheer 
force of will, against unresponsive ‘elites’ (which they purportedly do not 
belong to, regardless of background and personal trajectory) and institutions. 
Their discourse tends to mobilise through the construction of grievances 
based on sharp oppositions drawing upon common sense. However, when 
in power those leaders have tended to impose strongly neoliberal policies 
around taxation, trade, employment, finance, social security, housing, and 
so on. This experience is common to several countries – including Brazil.
2 CYCLES OF THE LEFT
The next peculiar aspect of the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism 
in Brazil is the trajectory of the political left in the country. This can be 
RDP Nº 97 – Jan-Fev/2021 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL ...............................................................................................................................107 
RDP, Brasília, Volume 18, n. 97, 103-119, jan./fev. 2021
outlined through a review of the two political cycles of the Brazilian left in 
the postwar era9. 
The first cycle began in the early 1940s, during the dictatorship of 
Getúlio Vargas. The left had been crushed by the Vargas regime in the late 
1930s, but it reconstituted itself largely through the campaign against nazi-
fascism, and for Brazilian participation in World War II on the side of the 
Allies. Left activity during this period was dominated by the Communist Party 
of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCB). The PCB was closely aligned 
with the USSR, and it grew rapidly during that period. In the early 1940s, the 
PCB had only a small band of activists, and its best-known leaders were in 
jail. By 1945, the PCB was a large, strong and disciplined organisation with 
hundreds of thousands of members, and it polled almost 10% of the votes in 
the national elections. 
The PCB was proscribed in 1947. Nevertheless, the Party continued 
to influence many trade unions, social organisations and the students’ 
movement. A few PCB members were elected to Congress and city 
administrations through other political parties, and the PCB forged relatively 
stable alliances with important segments of the non-Marxist left, especially 
the left-populist Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) and the centrist Social 
Democratic Party (PSD). These alliances with ‘bourgeois’ parties were 
important strategically, because the PCB argued that progressive change in 
Brazil required a broad alliance between the working class, the peasantry, 
the middle classes and the domestic (industrial) bourgeoisie, in order to lead 
a democratic and national development project against the ruling alliance 
between imperialist forces and semi-feudal landed interests.
The strategy of the PCB was comprehensively defeated in 1964. The 
domestic bourgeoisie and most of the middle classes shunned the left- 
-populist administration of President João Goulart, which was supported by 
the PCB; instead, they aligned themselves with the far right, local landed 
interests, and the US government. The workers, peasants and students were 
left isolated, and their organisations were destroyed. The dramatic failure 
of the PCB and the ensuing repression contributed to the fragmentation 
of the party, and led to the foundation of a whole range of small radical 
organisations inspired by Trotskyism, foquismo, Maoism, and so on. Some 
9 These cycles were first suggested by Benjamin (personal communication, June 2004); see also Bianchi and 
Braga (2003) and Boito (2003). The review of the history of the PT draws on Branford and Kucinski (2003, 
ch.1).
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of them sponsored or supported armed struggles against the dictatorship. 
These limited attempts at urban and rural guerrilla warfare were repressed 
brutally.
Mass resistance re-emerged gradually, in the mid-1970s. The defeat 
of the organised working class and the guerrilla movements removed 
part of the rationale for state terrorism, and the legitimacy of the regime 
was shaken by the results of the 1970 census, which showed that rapid 
economic growth had concentrated income and failed to deliver material 
improvements to the majority of the population. The regime’s reputation 
was further damaged by the economic slowdown after the first oil shock, 
in 1973, followed by the second shock, in 1979, and the international debt 
crisis, in 1982. Inflation climbed relentlessly, from 20% per annum towards 
200%, and Brazil’s economy stagnated. It became increasingly difficult for 
the regime to justify the denial of civil liberties in the name of ‘public safety’ 
or ‘competent economic management’. In 1974, the military government 
was comprehensively beaten in the elections for Congress. The ruling circles 
realised that the regime needed to respond to its political erosion, and they 
chose to embark on a slow, limited and tightly controlled process of political 
liberalisation, that ultimately led to the transfer of power to ‘reliable’ civilians 
in 1985.
The second cycle of the Brazilian left since World War 2 was defined 
by the fortunes of the PT. In the mid-1970s, several surviving left-wing 
organisations banded together with progressive Catholic groups, leftist 
intellectuals and young activists to demand the restoration of democracy, 
respect for human rights and political amnesty, as well as economic policy 
changes10. Petitions were followed by demonstrations, which were sometimes 
ignored and often repressed. At a later stage, a new trade union movement 
burst into the political scene. Those unions were based on the key industries 
emerging in the previous period, especially the metal, mechanical and auto 
industries located in and around the city of São Paulo, as well as finance, 
the large state-owned enterprises providing infrastructure and basic goods, 
and the civil service, especially the postal workers, nurses, doctors, teachers, 
and university lecturers. Over time, and in the wake of successive strikes, the 
10 Two especially important organisations were the Brazilian Movement for Amnesty (MBA), a broad front 
campaigning for amnesty to all political prisoners and the right of return of Brazilians exiled or banished for 
political reasons, and the Movement Cost of Living (MCV), that collected millions of signatures in petitions 
demanding inflation control and real wage increases for the low paid.
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metalworkers in São Paulo moved to the forefront of the Brazilian working 
class, led by their charismatic union leader, Luiz Inácio da Silva (Lula)11. 
The idea of founding a political party of a new type coalesced rapidly 
among those groups of activists. By late 1978, they were already discussing 
the foundation of a ‘Workers’ Party’ – a ‘party without bosses’ – in order to 
defeat the dictatorship and introduce a new model of development in the 
country12. That party should be untainted by the traditional features of the 
Brazilian left: populism, corruption, clientelism and Stalinism. The PT was 
eventually launched in 1980, under the leadership of Lula. The strategy and 
the mode of organisation of the PT corresponded to the opportunities offered 
by the crumbling military dictatorship, and the needs and composition of the 
Brazilian working class. The party grew rapidly, reaching 800,000 members 
in less than ten years. Its trade union confederation, CUT, represented up to 
20 million workers, and the PT made significant inroads into the students’ 
movement. These successes were reflected in the PT’s excellent performance 
at the ballot box, which culminated in Lula’s presidential election, in 2002, 
after three consecutive defeats, in 1989, 1994, and 199813. 
The growth of the PT was based on two main drivers. First, political 
demands for a radical democracy, incorporating but not limited to formal 
(procedural or ‘bourgeois’) democratic practices and processes. The PT 
demanded more: it advocated a (never clearly defined) ‘socialist democracy’, 
delivering power and economic betterment to the poor majority. Second, 
the PT defended the corporatist interests of the workers closely associated 
with the party. 
Unfortunately for the PT, and importantly for what was to follow, both 
drivers of growth collapsed between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. The 
achievement of political democracy changed radically the terrain in which 
the party had originally emerged. It had been relatively easy for the PT to 
offer a progressive alternative to a decrepit dictatorship that was increasingly 
powerless to discipline the populace, but that remained wedded to an 
anachronistic right-wing discourse while, at the same time, demonstrating 
staggering managerial incompetence, high levels of corruption, and an 
abysmal track record delivering income and welfare gains for the majority. 
11 He later changed his name to Luís Inácio Lula da Silva.
12 See Bianchi and Braga (2003).
13 For a review of the trajectory of the PT, see Branford and Kucinski (2003).
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The restoration of democracy changed everything. The institutions of 
the state were validated by their democratic veneer, compelling the PT to 
follow the electoral calendar and operate within the ‘bourgeois’ framework 
that the party had previously denounced. Political debates shifted away from 
lofty principles towards matters of detail embedded within parliamentary 
politics. Mass demonstrations were normalised. Implementation of PT 
policies now required a democratic mandate that, although feasible in 
principle, could be achieved only if the PT submitted itself to the logic of 
campaign finance, coalition-building, piecemeal reforms, negotiations with 
conflicting interest groups, and the imperatives of ‘efficiency’ and ‘delivery’ 
in local government. Those limitations tempered the PT’s enthusiasm for 
direct action, and increased the weight of its internal bureaucracy at the 
expense of ordinary militants and (radical) affiliated movements. 
Matters became worse in the late 1980s, with the economic transition 
to neoliberalism. The neoliberal ‘reforms’ severely weakened the groups that 
were the backbone of PT, provided the bulk of its votes and were affiliated 
to the most active trade unions: the manufacturing workers, the middle and 
lower-ranking civil servants, employees of state-owned enterprises, and other 
formal sector workers14. The trade union movement was severely degraded. 
Radicals lost ground to pragmatic leaders within CUT, and the unions split 
between those seeking immediate economic gains, and those continuing 
to demand radical changes in government policy. Rapid deindustrialisation 
and waves of privatisation weakened the manufacturing working class and 
the most organised sectors of the civil service. The student movement fell 
into irrelevance. The PT had to reconstitute its sources of support under these 
challenging circumstances. The party’s two-fold response helps to explain 
its later successes, as well as the limitations of the federal administrations led 
by Lula and Dilma Rousseff. 
After Lula’s successive electoral defeats, the party leadership persuaded 
itself that the PT must appeal to a more centrist constituency, and downplay its 
commitment to social change. The PT offered a discourse based on a vaguely 
progressive ethics and efficiency in public administration. Increasingly, the 
PT presented itself non-politically, as the only party untainted by corruption 
in Brazil. The narrowing of the PT’s transformative ambitions and the party’s 
shift towards administrative rather than radical priorities helped it to gain 
14 See Branford and Kucinski (2003, pp.32-4) and Saad-Filho and Mollo (2002).
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new constituencies, especially the moderate middle class, informal sector 
workers, and many domestic capitalists15.
Lula’s election brought the possibility of pushing for change from 
the top. The party was fortunate enough to reach executive power during 
an emerging global commodity boom, in the early 2000s. It proceeded 
to implement economic policies along a ‘path of least resistance’16. This 
choice of path referred, first, to the party’s commitment to political stability, 
that is, not trying to change the Constitution or to reform finance, land 
ownership, the media or the judicial system, not mobilising the workers 
and the poor, and not challenging the economic and political hegemony 
of the established economic, social and political elites in the country. The 
consequence was that, in order to govern, the PT had to rely on an unwieldy 
web of unprincipled political alliances and case-by-case negotiations. This 
arrangement implies that political stability during the administrations led 
by the PT depended on the party’s ability to deliver economic gains almost 
to everyone, while, simultaneously, maintaining its credibility with the 
strongest fractions of capital. This turned out to be possible only in times of 
economic prosperity.
The second feature of the PT’s path of least resistance was the party’s 
attachment to the so-called macroeconomic policy ‘tripod’ imposed 
by the previous administration, in 1999, that included inflation targets, 
floating exchange rates with free international movement of capital, and 
contractionary fiscal and monetary policies. The tripod was meant to secure 
the government’s credibility with capital, but it also limited drastically the 
scope for developmental initiatives and distributive policies. 
Third, the commitment to a national development project based on 
the expansion of domestic demand through public expenditures and transfers 
and the expansion of consumer loans, as well as state support for large 
domestic capital both at home and abroad. Inspired by the perceived success 
of the South Korean chaebol, the Brazilian government provided regulatory, 
financial and diplomatic support to large domestically-owned companies 
in the oil, shipbuiilding, telecoms, construction, food processing, and other 
sectors, in order to facilitate their expansion both at home and abroad. It 
was hoped that the combination of demand growth at home and support for 
15 Medeiros (2013, p.65).
16 See Loureiro and Saad-Filho (2019).
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the expansion of key firms would help to set off a virtuous circle including 
employment creation, the development of new technologies, growing 
competitvity, and improvement in the country’s balance of payments.
Fourth, the pursuit of distribution at the margin, primarily through the 
expansion of low-paid employment and rising transfers and minimum wages 
(which rose by 72% between 2005 and 2012, while real GDP per capita 
increased by 30 per cent). This led to a remarkable recovery of the wage 
share of national income, while also leaving unchanged the distribution of 
assets.
The limitations of the path of least resistance emerged gradually, 
first, through the continuing deterioration of the post-crisis environment 
and the tightening of the balance of payments constraint. Second, through 
an intractable productivity gap with the OECD, the inability of the state to 
deliver improvements in infrastructure and living conditions in urban areas, 
and the persistent dysfunctionality and speculative character of private 
finance. Third, the distribution of income driven by low-paid jobs and welfare 
transfers was limited, because it depended heavily on the marginal income 
created by economic growth. This model of distribution also implied that the 
middle class would be squeezed by the preservation of the privileges of the 
rich, the improvement of the poorest, and the deteriorating quality and rising 
cost of urban services. This could be compensated only temporarily by the 
expansion of personal credit and the appreciation of the currency. Fourth, for 
all its strengths, the administration led by Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, 
suffered from severe political and administrative shortcomings. This led to 
the gradual loss of support of core social groups and political parties in 
her coalition, to the point that, by 2016, the government could count only 
on disorganised, conditional and minority support across the country. A 
large alliance of elites, including most right-wing political leaders, finance, 
the media, the upper middle class, business and the higher echelons of 
the civil service, with strong US support, moved to impeach the President 
on trumped-up charges of fiscal malfeasance17. The coup against Rousseff 
marks the closure of the second cycle of the Brazilian left. Since then, the 
administrations led by Rousseff’s former Vice-President, Michel Temer, and, 
17 For detailed accounts of Dilma’s impeachment, see Amaral (2016, part I), Gentili (2016) and Saad-Filho and 
Morais (2018, ch.9). Nobre (2017, p.139) argues that Rousseff fell because her government could no longer 
function according to the rules of the Brazilian political system: it was incapable of protecting allied politicians 
from judicial attack, and unable to secure access to public funds for the parties in her coalition. 
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more recently, by Jair Bolsonaro, have devoted themselves to imposing a 
vicious modality of economic neoliberalism by authoritarian means, with a 
severe attack on fiscal policy tools and the emerging Brazilian welfare state. 
3 AUTHORITARIAN NEOLIBERALISM IN PRACTICE
The emergence of the alliance of elites that overthrew President 
Rousseff also marks the third key aspect of the election of Jair Bolsonaro. 
In contrast with previous right-wing mobilisations – most recently, in the 
mid-1930s, between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, and in 1990-92 
– the current alliance of elites did not appeal centrally to outdated anti- 
-communist discourses inspired by the Cold War, which would have 
been absurd, and it was not inspired by Catholic values, due to the much 
greater influence of protestant sects today. Instead, the new alliance of 
elites mobilised against a poorly defined danger of ‘Bolivarianism’, and the 
fictional threat of ‘left-wing authoritarianism’ led by the PT. The alliance also 
called for ‘the end of corruption’, which was code for ‘the destruction of 
the PT’. It has become evident that the strategic goal of the alliance of elites 
was the restriction of democracy, through the imposition of an authoritarian 
modality of neoliberalism, in order to eliminate government autonomy from 
the privileged classes, reinforce the structures of exclusion, and abolish the 
spaces by which the majority might control any levers of public policy18. 
The middle class provided critically important support for the alliance 
of elites. Their frustration is understandable. While large capital tended 
to prosper, not least through the implementation of neoliberal policies by 
successive governments, the workers and the poor also gained under the 
PT, through higher minimum wages and expanded welfare provision, the 
creation of millions of low-wage jobs, and new avenues for social mobility, 
for example through racial quotas for universities and the civil service. In the 
meantime, the middle class was squeezed by the erosion of its traditional 
careers, especially in middle management, banking, and the upper layers of 
the civil service19. The scarcity of ‘good jobs’ intensified with the economic 
slowdown since 2011. 
18 See Fortes (2016), Saad-Filho and Morais (2018, ch.9), and Singer (2015).
19 For example, while 950,000 jobs paying more than 5 times the minimum wage were created in the 1990s, 
4.3 million were lost in the 2000s; see Pochmann (2012).
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The middle class was penalised further by rising minimum wages and 
the extension of employment rights to domestic workers (cleaners, nannies, 
cooks, drivers, gardeners, security guards, and so on, which are ubiquitous 
in middle class households). They also lost out because of the diffusion of 
means-tested transfer programmes, which the middle class helps to fund 
through the tax system, but cannot claim because their incomes exceed the 
threshold by a large margin. Perhaps even more serious was the expansion of 
citizenship rights to the poor, which threatened the paternalistic relationships 
in middle class homes. During the PT administrations, while both the rich 
and the poor prospered, the middle class found it difficult to maintain their 
(relative as well as absolute) economic and social status, and their children 
had limited scope to emulate the achievements of their parents. 
Under intense economic and ideological pressure, middle class groups 
became increasingly attached to a neoliberal-globalist project that secures 
their advantages against the poor, even though it inevitably slows down 
economic growth. For example, it was often claimed that the deterioration 
of urban infrastructure and public services was due to rising incomes and the 
expansion of rights under the PT; that is, the government ‘allowed’ too many 
people to own automobiles, fly, and access universities and private health 
facilities which, logically, should be privatised and become more expensive 
in order to restore a more convenient balance between demand and supply20. 
The implications of low investment and weak development policy were 
ignored, perhaps because they would suggest the need for higher levels of 
public spending21. These pressures led the middle class to abandon the PT 
en masse and shift their support to the PT’s main rival, the PSDB (Partido da 
Social-Democracia Brasileira, Brazilian Social-Democratic Party) and other 
right-wing parties in the mid-2000s. Gradually, the middle class became, 
once again, the mass base of the far right in Brazil22.
The social and political realignment in the country led to the rise of 
a mass movement supporting an authoritarian variety of neoliberalism. The 
rise of authoritarian neoliberalism in Brazil had two peculiar features, in 
contrast with similar political processes and movements elsewhere. First, a 
relatively subdued role for overtly racist and nationalist discourses; instead, 
the Brazilian variety of authoritarian neoliberalism pursues close links with 
20 For a review of middle class ideologies and policy preferences, see Ricci (2012) and Tible (2013).
21 See Medeiros (2013, p.59).
22 See, for example, Nepomuceno (2015).
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the USA, bordering on outright submission (see, for example, the sale of 
aerospace giant Embraer to Boeing, and the concession of the Alcantara 
rocket launch base to the USA, among many possible examples). Second, 
while in the advanced economies the main ‘losers’ are, typically, found 
among the blue collar working class (see above), the most prominent losers 
during the federal administrations led by the PT were in the middle class23. 
President Jair Bolsonaro emerged from this milieu. His electoral 
campaign was supported by an assortment of small parties and neophyte 
politicians, coalescing around four themes. First, allegations of ‘corruption’ 
against a broad swath of politicians, drawing upon Bolsonaro’s purported 
status as a political outsider (despite a 28-year career as Federal Deputy). 
Second, conservative moral values and the rollback of citizenship. The 
candidate attacked social movements and the left because they are ‘corrupt’, 
‘communist’ and ‘godless’, and advocated the restoration of ‘lost’ cultural 
values by deathly violence. Third, public security and easier access to 
weapons, which has a strong appeal in a country enduring over 60,000 
murders per year. Fourth, a neoliberal economic programme, drawing upon 
the intuitively appealing notion of reducing bureaucracy and the deadweight 
of a corrupt state. 
Once in power, the Bolsonaro administration rapidly degenerated into 
comical chaos, at least in its political side. In contrast, its implications for the 
environment were nothing short of disastrous, as was amply demonstrated by 
the accelerated devastation of the Amazon rainforest. Fnially, the economic 
side was dominated by Finance Minister Paulo Guedes, a minor ‘Chicago 
Boy’ in General Pinochet’s Chile, and a banker and occasional academic in 
Brazil. Guedes’s main priority is to dismantle Brazil’s progressive pensions 
system in order to introduce one based on individual accounts, minimal 
redistribution between generations or classes, and tough restrictions upon 
drawing up pension income. His proposal is so restrictive that most low 
earners with unstable jobs will never achieve the contributions threshold 
required to claim benefits, while the rich will tend to choose private 
pensions offering more flexible conditions and uncapped returns. At a further 
remove, Guedes has announced plans to privatise ‘everything’, starting with 
the country’s airports, parts of Petrobras and a whole raft of state-owned 
enterprises, and, finally, a tax reform introducing a less progressive system. 
23 For a detailed overview of this period, see Saad-Filho and Morais (2018).
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Across all its dimensions, then, as well as personal corruption, abetment 
of crime and sheer crassness and brutality, Bolsonaro’s administration 
expresses the worst of the worst political times in living memory.
CONCLUSION
The election of Jair Bolsonaro was part of the rise of an authoritarian 
modality of neoliberalism in Brazil which, in turn, is one instance 
among many of the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism globally. These 
experiences are contextual, including different combinations of organised 
mass movements, political parties, ‘spectacular’ self-referential leaders, 
racism, nationalism, and distinct sets of economic and social ‘losers’ from 
neoliberalism. Across these experiences, in countries as diverse as Brazil, 
Egypt, Hungary, Italy, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and 
the USA, among others, common traits are also present among the diversity 
of processes, institutions and outcomes. Across this diversity of cases, it 
remains clear that global neoliberalism has entered a distinctive phase of 
crisis management in the economic sphere, through specific (authoritarian, 
personalistic, overtly nationalist but, at the core, radically neoliberal) 
modalities of crisis politics24.
In the case of Brazil, the rise of Jair Bolsonaro, as a clear instance of 
authoritarian neoliberalism, can be examined from four angles. First, since 
2013 Brazilian politics has been defined by a convergence of dissatisfactions. 
Disparate demands and conflicting expectations have buttressed an alliance 
of elites supporting an authoritarian neoliberal economic, social and 
political programme, that is destructive of collectivity and citizenship. The 
regressive nature of this programme was veiled by a media-sponsored far- 
-right discourse stressing the ‘incompetence’ of the PT’s administrations, 
their ‘populism’, and rampant corruption.
Second, the cycles of the Brazilian right, including the most recent one, 
suggest that, in Brazil, the powerful tend to rise up if their wealth is directly 
threatened, or if economic privilege fails to secure political prominence. 
Nevertheless, mass support for the revolt of the elites depends heavily on the 
mobilisation of the middle class.
24 For an overview, see Boffo, Saad-Filho and Fine (2019).
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Third, in recent years the far right has achieved ideological hegemony 
and a solid electoral majority in Brazil, despite the lack of stable leadership, 
strong movements and solid parties. This is a paradox, and the Brazilian 
experience stands in sharp contrast with authoritarian neoliberalism 
experiences elsewhere. That is, while in several countries well-organised 
movements led by experienced leaders succeeded in achieving power 
by electoral or other means, in Brazil the state was hijacked in 2016 by 
a squabbling band of reactionary and deeply corrupt politicians who, in 
turn, passed the baton to a rabble of inexperienced, inept, idiosyncratic, 
corrupt and ultra-reactionary mobsters and conmen, thriving despite the 
lack of stable structures of support, and sowing a politics of hatred that they 
barely control. Their greatest ambition is to impose an uncompromising 
neoliberal and anti-national development strategy, which cannot flourish 
in a democracy: their rule can be enforced only by authoritarian means, 
and the inevitable political impasses will tend to be resolved outside the 
Constitution.
Fourth, despite the fractures and insufficiencies on the right, the 
Brazilian left remains hampered by internal disputes about the past 
(especially the role of the PT and the consequences of its political choices), 
and it lacks a cogent programme for the future. The absence of alternatives 
and the pronounced shift in the political centre of gravity of the country to 
the far right, especially in the largest urban areas and the wealthiest regions, 
suggest that the left may be unable to govern Brazil even in the medium- 
-term, unless it succeeds in reinventing itself.
The worst economic crisis in Brazil’s recorded history and the 
most severe political impasse in the last century have degraded Brazilian 
democracy, and made it impossible for any plausible composition of political 
forces to govern the country within its democratic Constitution. The nation 
is tearing itself apart, socially, economically and politically. Whether or not 
Brazil will slide into an overt politics of violence, as in Colombia or Mexico, 
drawing upon drug wars, gun trafficking and state terrorism, or, alternatively, 
whether or not democracy will implode because of a military coup, it is highly 
likely that we are witnessing the inglorious end to a democratic experiment 
that has marked two generations, and that achieved significant successes 
during this period. The best – and, possibly, the only – alternative to this 
unambiguously negative outcome for the majority demands the protagonism 
of a new wave of left movements and organisations. They would offer the 
best hope to lift the curse to have befallen Brazil.
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